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FOREWORD

War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in
American national security policy and alters strategic
balances and relationships around the world. The specific
effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In
some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it
may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.
To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled
Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. In each, the
author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position
that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military
action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after
the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the
region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with
Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is
pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and
Department of Defense in crafting the most effective
strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of
war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT
WITH IRAQ: SOUTHEAST ASIA
Conclusions:

· The general consensus on what constitutes Southeast Asia is the
region covered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). The ten members of ASEAN are Brunei, Burma
1
(Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
·

Membership in ASEAN, which has concluded various agreements
on anti-terrorism, and has often forged a common foreign policy, does
not imply a unified approach to U.S. action in Iraq. U.S. relationships
in Southeast Asia range from intimate security relationships with
Singapore and the Philippines to a nonrelationship in the case of
Burma. Therefore the impact on U.S. relationships in this region will
be varied.

·

Most relationships will, in fact, ride out possible adverse
consequences from conflict in Iraq, but objections will be two-fold.
While states like the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand could be
described as generally supportive of the United States in the war
against terrorism and are not alarmed by the doctrine of preemption,
several other Southeast Asian states consistently have cited
nonintervention and absolute state sovereignty to either oppose, or
remain unengaged, in various interventions over the last decade. New
ASEAN members like Burma, Laos, and Vietnam have been unhappy
with “humanitarian intervention,” being critical of the NATO
operation in Kosovo, and refusing to be involved in the peacekeeping
operation in East Timor. Therefore, armed invasion of Iraq will not sit
well with these states, but they will do little more than verbally oppose
it. Disagreement over an intervention, however, is nothing new in
these relationships.

· States with majority Muslim populations such as Indonesia and
Malaysia will face popular discontent over a U.S. invasion of Iraq.
States with minority Muslim populations will see similar discontent,
but these sentiments will not have the same impact on government
decisionmaking. The U.S. relationship with Indonesia is the most
likely to be damaged by a conflict with Iraq. A protracted war in Iraq
would be most damaging to U.S. relations with Southeast Asia’s
Islamic community.
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Reactions to the Global War against Terrorism.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, outraged governments throughout Southeast Asia, as they did around the
world. All Southeast Asian countries condemned the
attacks and expressed sympathy to the United States and
its people. Washington sought support, in particular, from
both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks. Within days President Megawati of
Indonesia made a trip to the United States—a trip that was
kept on track despite a general shut down of air traffic—in
which the Indonesian leader denounced terrorism. The
symbolism of the leader of the world’s largest Muslim
country decrying international terrorism was important to
U.S. policymakers.
Megawati’s resolve to back the United States evaporated
once she returned to Indonesia. While international news
media exaggerated the extent of potentially violent street
protests in Jakarta—principally aimed at the U.S.
Embassy—and tended to conflate them with wider public
opinion, it became clear that Megawati could not count on
the support of the Indonesian population to back up the
United States in the counterattack against al Qaeda—
namely the invasion of Afghanistan. First, many Indonesians surveyed were in denial about the nature of the
terrorist attacks. After all, was not the Oklahoma City
bombing initially blamed on Islamic terrorists? This event
is well-known to the Indonesian public. Second, rumors
circulated among the internet savvy that Mossad was
behind the attacks, and that all Jews were sent text
messages to stay away from the World Trade Center on
September 11—the origin of these rumors was from the
Middle East. Third, many Indonesians simply refused to
believe that Osama bin Laden was guilty of the September
11 attacks and the evidence for this. Fourth, even when
Osama bin Laden virtually confessed to the attacks, there
was no support for a U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Many
political and religious leaders (and not just Muslims)
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argued that bin Laden’s guilt should be determined in an
international court, not through force of arms (incidentally,
this is entirely contrary to Indonesian obstinance over an
international court for crimes in East Timor). Fifth,
Megawati’s political opponents used the events
surrounding September 11 to pressure her. The Council of
Ulama—a body set up by former president Soeharto and
with ongoing links to the now opposition Golkar Party—
even issued a call for “Jihad” against the United States.2
Vice President and leader of the Islamist United
Development Party (PPP), Hamzah Haz, undermined his
president’s U.S. visit by suggesting that the September 11
might “cleanse” the United States of its “sins.” He would
later meet with the arrested head of the Islamist militia
group Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib, and visit the
boarding school of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, head of Jemaah
Islamiyah—an Al Qaeda affiliate. Megawati, as a woman
and a nominal syncretic Muslim, is vulnerable to the charge
that she is not an orthodox Muslim, and her opponents have
indirectly tried to use this against her. The Bali bombing of
October 12, 2002, which took around 200 lives (including 88
Australians), convinced a hitherto skeptical political and
religious elite of the problem of homegrown terrorism, and
strengthened the case for cooperation in the war against
international terrorism.
In Indonesia two overlapping themes generally feed into
distrust of U.S. motivations, especially as they relate to
Afghanistan. For most Indonesians—Muslim and nonMuslim—there is a distrust of U.S. foreign policy. The
reported CIA involvement in attempts to undermine
President Soekarno in the 1950s, and a probable role in the
counter-coup that took half a million lives in 1965-66, has
left an indelible impression of U.S. meddling in Indonesian
affairs. East Timor, hardships arising from the stipulations
of the International Monetary Fund, and human rights
demands are the latest manifestations. Also, a growing body
of Muslim opinion in Indonesia believes that the United
States, and the west in general, will intervene to defend
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western interests or Christian populations, but fails to act
when Muslims are in trouble. Generally this line was
formed around the experience of East Timor, when in
actuality the west has intervened a number of times on
behalf of Muslim populations, for example, Somalia, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and so on. Nonetheless, while many Indonesian
officials view the U.S. military presence in the Asia/Pacific
as benign, deep-seated suspicion about U.S. intentions still
exists with regard to the Muslim world. Even moderates
have accused Washington of trying to weaken the world of
Islam. In this sense, the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis
enjoys some currency with opinion makers in Indonesia.
Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia was
equally vocal in condemning the terrorist attacks—and
later went on to propose at the Organization of Islamic
Conference that suicide bombings in Israel/Palestine also
should be considered acts of terrorism. Like Megawati,
however, Mahathir refused to support the U.S. counterattack in Afghanistan. Mahathir has been a vocal critic of
the west in the past, and the ruling United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO) party has shown Islamist tendencies
with apostasy laws proposed in some states. Mahathir
himself once declared that Malaysia was an “Islamic State.”
(Although the Malaysian Constitution establishes Islam as
the religion of the Federation of Malaysia, application of
religious laws is left to the state authorities, who have
interpreted this provision as a symbolic statement.)
Mahathir, after September 11, became one of the most vocal
Islamic leaders to criticize radical Islamist movements.
This dramatic shift can be explained in terms of national
interest and regime survival. Malaysia claimed to have
already uncovered a terrorist threat on its own soil prior to
September 11. Second, Mahathir saw an opportunity to
drive a wedge between the opposition coalition of the
Islamist PAS (Partai Islam SeMalaysia) and various
pro-democracy parties (the opposition coalition split on
September 22, 2001). In the 2000 election, UMNO had
suffered one of its worst results, but Mahathir was able to
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use international events to paint his PAS rivals as
dangerous radicals—PAS played into his hands by
declaring a “Jihad” against the United States (like the
Indonesian Council of Ulama, they left this term
ambiguous). PAS’ fortunes have declined ever since, as
revealed in several by-election disappointments for the
Islamist party, and Malay voters have largely returned to
the UMNO fold.
In general, most Southeast Asian states have both
supported the United States in the war against terror, as
several of these states share the deep concern about the
challenge international terrorism poses, not least of all
because it has posed a direct threat to countries of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines (and to
a lesser extent Thailand and Cambodia). Indonesia
belatedly sought assistance in rounding up 40 members of
the Jemaah Islamiyah in the aftermath of the Bali blast,
and elite opinion has shifted to the extent that there is now
recognition of the problem.
Current Reactions to U.S. Policy on Iraq.
Reactions to current U.S. policy with regards to Iraq are
varied within Southeast Asia. The Philippines has been the
most supportive of American policy, with or without UN
backing. Singapore, the other nation-state in Southeast
Asia that enjoys a close security relationship with the
United States, is more guarded in arguing for a second
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution to
resolve the impasse. Singapore traditionally has
constructed its foreign policy in such a way as not to provoke
its larger Muslim neighbors, and one understands the need
to tread carefully. The other ASEAN states have all asked
for a UN approach to the problem of Iraq. Vietnam, a
constant proponent of absolute sovereignty, has argued for
a “political solution . . . based on the respect of the
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iraq
and in line with the United Nations Charter and
5

international law.”3 Cambodia argued against the use of
violence, but has also urged Iraq to accept the UN process.
Thailand has also urged the United States to go through UN
channels, as have Malaysia and Indonesia. While both
Malaysia and Indonesia accept that Iraq needs to dismantle
its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability, both
governments have opposed the war option in this
case—urging that inspectors be allowed to complete their
work. In February 2003, Kuala Lumpur was host to the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), in which
Mahathir stated that the issue of Iraq would be discussed.
Malaysia’s foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, did oppose
the suggestions of some at the OIC that Saddam Hussein be
encouraged into exile, urging that the UN process be
maintained on course. He added: “We hold the view that
whatever system of government practiced in a country or
the system of government to be installed should be
determined by the people of the country concerned.”4
In Indonesia’s case, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda
publicly has poured cold water on U.S. claims of Iraqi
intransigence, saying that intelligence offered so far is less
than adequate and that the work of the UN weapons
inspectors is necessary to establish any guilt. Indonesia has
staunchly opposed a U.S.-led attack that falls outside the
UN process. Indonesia has long been an opponent of
sanctions against Iraq, which were imposed after the
1990-91 Gulf War. During Abdurrahman Wahid’s term as
head of state, the president made a visit to Iraq and used the
occasion to champion the repeal of the sanctions regime.
Reports of the plight of the Iraqi people are well-known in
Indonesia, and are a source of anger against the west (and
the United States in particular). It is significant, however,
that Indonesia would accept a UNSC resolution on the
current crisis, even if that meant a UN cover for any war
effort in Iraq. An Indonesian foreign affairs spokesman told
BBC News that while the government has faced domestic
opposition on many foreign policy issues in the past, on the
issue of Iraq the government is in accord with public
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sentiment.5 In fact, Indonesia’s approach can be explained
on domestic grounds. Why should a UNSC resolution for
war be more palatable than U.S. “preemption”? Having a
UN sheen on an action in Iraq makes it far easier to explain
to a domestic audience. Clearly a broad section of the
Indonesian people are opposed to any war against Iraq, and
Muslim groups and NGO groups (including some women’s
syndicates) have demonstrated against U.S. action in the
Middle East. It is important to note that Indonesia’s
mainstream Muslim groups rejected Osama bin Laden’s
call for violent opposition to the United States. The Head of
Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul
Ulama, argues that the Iraq issue is principally political,
and Muslims should not see this as a religious struggle.
However, the fear, publicly expressed by both civic and
religious leaders in Indonesia and throughout Southeast
Asia, is that war in Iraq will lead many Southeast Asian
Muslims to view the conflict as religious in nature.
The Possible Impact of War in Iraq.
Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar was asked
in a CNN interview in January 2003 what the consequences
of a war with Iraq would be. He replied:
I think it will be a major complicating factor, particularly if it
is seen as an action outside the auspices of the United Nations,
and particularly if the presentation is not managed properly.
By that I mean, if it is presented as a conflict aimed at Muslim
populations or Muslim peoples, that will be unfortunate. It
should be presented for what it really is, the issue of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and disarmament. I think that it’s
important the presentation—focus on the WMD. If it is not,
then I think countries that have predominantly Muslim
population would find it a complicating issue.6

The great concern for Indonesia and Malaysia, and by
extension Singapore—due its proximity—and states like
Cambodia and Thailand with Muslim minorities that their
governments hope will remain integrated within society, is
7

that international events could have a destabilizing
influence.
As the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan
demonstrates, the nature of the war in Iraq, rather than war
itself, will be the key determinant to the impact of any U.S.
action in Iraq. While the prospect of an Afghanistan war
initially elicited heated responses from Muslims in
Southeast Asia, the relatively easy dispatch of the Taleban
by the Northern Alliance, the clear rejoicing at the end of
Taleban rule (or at least the impression that the war to
defeat the Taleban enjoyed popular legitimacy), and the
U.S. success in minimizing civilian casualties, worked to
undermine public anger.
How a war with Iraq will affect Muslim populations in
Southeast Asia—already jaded towards U.S. foreign
policy—will depend greatly on the perceived conduct of the
war itself. Overall, war in Iraq will increase anger directed
at the United States. War in Iraq is an unknown entity. A
critical question is, will the removal of Saddam Hussein be
supported by the majority of Iraqi people? While military
estimates of victory against Iraq in a full-scale invasion
range from 2 weeks to a month, lack of domestic legitimacy
in Iraq for any action by the United States could lead to
widespread low level opposition (including the hard core of
the Republican Guard or general insurgency) to the U.S.-led
occupation. A further complication will be providing for the
60 percent of the Iraqi population who rely on government
distribution for food needs with sustenance once the Iraqi
lines of distribution have been disrupted.
If Saddam Hussein were to employ WMD whether in the
battlefield, against Israel, or the United States,
governments throughout Southeast Asia would accept that
Iraq represents the same type of terrorist threat that al
Qaeda poses (bearing in mind that some Southeast Asian
governments do not accept a Saddam-bin Laden link at
present). They also would largely go along with the UN
resolution which would surely result, enabling the United
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States and its allies to occupy Iraq. In the court of public
opinion within Southeast Asia, massive attacks by Saddam
Hussein would not play well, however some more radical
groups would perceive such attacks as justice for America’s
“sins”—in fact, some Islamist groups may wholly support a
WMD strike on Israel, in particular. On balance, most
mainstream Muslim opinion, as wary as it is of U.S. policy
(especially on Israel/Palestine), would be as critical of
Saddam’s use of WMD as it was of the al Qaeda attacks.
Economic Impact.
The potential impact of a war in Iraq will be great for all
the Southeast Asian economies—with the exception of
Burma which is barely integrated into the world economy.
Most of the Southeast Asian economies depend heavily on
trade and are vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the global
economy, which is likely to experience a downturn in the
coming months. Rising prices will hit the oil consuming
countries, but will provide the small consolation of better
returns for Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia as net oil and
gas exporters. However, the picture looks most gloomy for
Indonesia, already coming off the worst financial meltdown
of the Asian Financial Crisis. In 2002, investment levels
halved from the previous year due to legal complications
over political devolution to more than 300 districts and the
emergence of domestic terrorism. The growth of a radical
fringe in Indonesia, coupled with perceptions in the investor
community (domestic and foreign) that Indonesia cannot
curb such Jihadi groups (in contrast to Malaysia), will be a
serious blow to Indonesia’s economic growth.
Perceptions of U.S. Intentions and Motivations.
In a sense, the war against terrorism in the long run can
only be won by winning public opinion within the Muslim
world. Southeast Asian Muslims, famed for their moderate
religious and political views and their smooth integration
into secular society (the Southern Philippines is a partial
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exception), distrust U.S. power projection. This is most
evident in modern Indonesia for both nationalist and
co-religionist reasons. Political and religious elites in
Indonesia, and to some extent in Malaysia, see inconsistencies within the U.S. approach. Indonesian government
officials have questioned Washington’s view of what
constitutes a “terrorist,” given the refusal of the U.S. State
Department to add the Aceh separatists to the list of
international terror organizations—the United States will
only call a group “terrorist” when it impacts on western
interests, they argue. Both Malaysia and Indonesia note the
apparent uneven nature of policy towards Israel, which has
failed to allow a Palestinian state and also possesses WMD.
While both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments do
not fear encroachment by the United States and quietly
welcome the U.S. force presence in littoral Asia, there
remains, especially in Indonesia, a lingering fear of
American attempts to establish some kind of imperial rule
over the Islamic world.
For the rest of Southeast Asia, the dislike of intervention
by the new ASEAN members notwithstanding, little will
change. The United States will continue to be viewed as a
benign hegemon.
Post-Conflict Reconstruction.
Support from the Philippines will be forthcoming.
Singapore and Thailand, despite public pronouncements in
support of the UN process, will support U.S. action—
although for reasons of realpolitik, Singapore’s position will
be outwardly cautious. These three countries would be
involved in a post-conflict peace building exercise if
involvement in past UN operations is indicative. There is
little chance that Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
will become involved in the war effort, or its aftermath—all
are domestically focused and disinclined to participate in
intervention missions, UN peacekeeping, or UN peacebuilding. For Malaysia and Indonesia, the constraints of
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domestic opinion will be very obvious, and will limit possible
support for the United States, although UN support will be
the critical element for these countries. Regardless of the
process of the war, Malaysia, and probably Indonesia, too,
will attempt to contribute to a post-war settlement in Iraq.
Conclusions.
The Overall Impact on U.S. Standing and Partnerships
in Southeast Asia.
A U.S. war in Iraq will impact differently on the various
partnerships within Southeast Asia. Most of these
relationships will remain as they were, with possible
pressure on Malaysia and Indonesia over their ties to the
United States. Even in Malaysia, one suspects, the
Mahathir government can both control radical elements
and sway more moderate Muslim opinion, and this
relationship will ride out initial anger over the war. In
Indonesia, public anger, and the actions of fringe terror
groups, have the most potential to undermine the relationship—one that already has been under enormous strain.
There, too, the U.S.-Indonesia relationship will outlive a
disagreement over Iraq, but the levels of distrust in the
United States may be notched up further and have
implications for other sectors of interest.
The impact on the overall U.S. strategic position in
Southeast Asia largely will be unchanged. The large
number of port calls by the U.S. Navy to the countries of
maritime Southeast Asia will continue as before, although
there are no permanent bases in Southeast Asia. Two
rumored options for further military engagement in the
region, the re-establishment of a permanent presence in the
Philippines and port visits to Vietnam, will also not be
affected by war in Iraq. The impact of a war in Iraq will be
felt on the diplomatic front, and it will involve the war
against terrorism.
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The Impact on the Pursuit of the War on Terrorism in
Southeast Asia.
It remains the case that Malaysia and Indonesia have
publicly expressed doubts about the links between Iraq and
al Qaeda, and it would be fair to say that the Muslim
community throughout Southeast Asia remains highly
skeptical. But the prospect of war in Iraq does have
implications for the war against terrorism, and again this is
principally in Indonesia. Since September 11, the United
States, Singapore, and Malaysia have had a very difficult
task in urging the Indonesian government to take seriously
the problem of international terrorism—especially as it
relates to the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
group, an affiliate of al Qaeda. The Bali blast in 2002
changed this lethargy to some degree. Open opposition
within the Indonesian public for a war against Saddam
Hussein could translate into a strained relationship with
the United States, which would impact ultimately on
anti-terrorist efforts—or a government less inclined to be
seen to be yielding to foreign “demands.”
Prolonged conflict in Iraq that brings with it enormous
civilian deaths—from fighting or starvation—will touch an
existing raw nerve and radicalize some within the Muslim
community in Southeast Asia, possibly to join extremist
groups, or to give them succor or sympathy. It is impossible
to know the extent to which this might occur, but potentially
war in Iraq, which very well carries its own merits, could
prove to be seed for jihadi groups in Southeast Asia. A quick
conquest of Iraq, with widespread legitimacy, will undercut
this phenomenon.
The sizeable Muslim community in the Philippines,
which has been considered in little detail in this report, will
most likely be unhappy with U.S. intervention in Iraq;
however, this population is in no position to exert pressure
on government policy. The vast majority of Muslims are
confined to the south of the Philippines, and the various
ethnic groups of Mindanao and the surrounding islands are
12

very much alienated from the Philippines government. War
in Iraq will not alter, either way, the difficulties of the
Philippine Muslim south. The introduction of U.S.
personnel to assist in training for combat operations against
the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) on Basilan island was the
direct result of September 11. Although many have
questioned whether ASG, largely a gang of kidnappers, are
linked to bin Laden, al Qaeda operatives have attempted to
contact separatist leaders in Mindanao. The United States
will continue to provide support for the Philippines
government in bringing its restive hinterland—not just the
south, but the Maoist-oriented New People’s Army (NPA)
areas—under control.
Recommendations.

·

·

Winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim
community in Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia
and Indonesia, is important in America’s war against
global terrorism. Cooperation from governments in
Southeast Asia will help prevent jihadi relocating
from Central Asia, and will work against the
emergence of domestic terror networks.

·

The conduct of the war in Iraq could have a dramatic
impact on Southeast Asia’s Muslim communities. A
quick war in Iraq with few civilian casualties, and one
accepted by the Iraqi people, will convince Southeast
Asia’s Muslims that the conflict was justified—or at
least not some kind of latter day imperial conquest.
An invasion that lacks support by the Iraqi people,
one in which the United States become mired in low
level conflict, will radicalize fringe groups within
Southeast Asia against the United States.
Another critical component to legitimacy of action
against Iraq would be UN support. Ideally the United
States should work through the UN process in dealing
with the Iraq problem. Any military action in the
13

future, were it to be sanctioned by the UN, would be
vastly more palatable to countries like Indonesia and
Singapore.

·

·

For the most part, relationships with Southeast Asia
will be unaffected by war in Iraq, with Indonesia as
the possible exception. If the war in Iraq is in
America’s national interest, it must be expected that
this could have negative consequences for the war
against jihadi groups in Indonesia.

·

The United States needs to continue stressing that
Islam is not regarded as the enemy.
In the case of Iraq, the United States should continue
pressing the point that the key issue revolves around
removal of Saddam Hussein’s potential for regional
aggression, including WMD development, which
poses a serious threat to Iraq’s neighbors. Beyond the
post-Iraq War settlement, serious attention to other
conflict areas in the Middle East, particularly
Israel/Palestine, will go a long way in convincing
Muslim opinion in Southeast Asia the U.S. foreign
policy has some consistency.
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1. Even the name of the country itself is the subject of controversy.
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Government.
2. The term Jihad in Islam simply means to “struggle.” The Council
of Ulama refused to clarify what they meant by Jihad, which is usually
seen as meaning “holy war” in the west.
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